Ukrainian counteroffensive
Why does the Battle for Bakhmut matter?
By following @secretsqrl123 , who doesn't need the source "trust me bro" because we have the Sentinel satellites, if we need to see how the Russian troops are moving on the front, I found out that the Russians want to bring at least 2 divisions from their reserves to fight against 2 Ukrainian brigades, presumably in the north, but especially in the south.
1. Why do I think it's especially in the South? Because after AFU liberates Klisckiivcha (it's just a matter of time), they can attack obliquely/asymmetrically. For those interested in what the asymmetric attack means, there is a whole literature related to it, but to better understand what I mean, an example would be the attack of Alexander the Great's army against Darius' army at the Battle of Gaugamela, where Alexander the Great attacked obliquely, being outnumbered, attacking the right and center flank (where Darius' guards - the famous Immortals - were stationed) and practically through this method, they managed to penetrate a much better prepared, larger adversary on its own territory, having all the possible advantages.
In that battle and in others in history, including the most famous one using the encirclement method, but not through what we call a "pincer" or a clamp, but by drawing a semicircle, is the Battle of Tobruk.
In both situations, presented here (which are not exceptions, but the rule), the attackers were outnumbered in terms of force, but the use of oblique/asymmetric attack and encirclement, using part of the army to distract the enemy, led them to achieve their goal. In the case of Alexander the Great, the objective was the retreat of Darius and his advance, and in the case of Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps, it was the conquest of the port of Tobruk, which shortened the Nazi logistic lines from Italy to North Africa.
2. Let's get back to the subject after this introduction. If we assume that the Russians will try to strengthen their positions in the north of Bakhmut (Krasna Hora, Soledar, and obviously Bakhmut) by mobilizing at least 5-6,000 additional people from the eastern front, AFU can use the encirclement tactic well beyond Bakhmut in the east and make a junction with their forces north of Soledar. This would not only cut off the Russian supply lines but also trap tens of thousands of Russian soldiers in that area.
3. What I announced almost 2 days ago about Klischiivka has been confirmed, now there is evidence including through geolocation that the Ukrainians are at the gates of the town (some sources say that the town has already been entered last night - but these are unconfirmed sources). And this opens up the possibility of using the aforementioned tactic.
4. Well, you want to sound smart and keep talking about technical stuff, tell us once, what does this mean for Ukraine and its goal of liberating its territories?
At the operational level, the objective for this year [SPECULATING here, it's an opinion] is to sever the land bridge between Donbas and Crimea. And for that, the complexity of maneuvers is needed. Carl von Clausewitz, considered one of the greatest theorists of war, said that "all things in war are simple, but the simplest thing is difficult" - in other words, everything seems easy on paper, but it is very hard to put into practice, especially when we are talking about the lives of people.
Therefore, alongside the simulated attacks from the entire southern front, technically called "feign attacks," which practically force the Russians - who at the command level appear extremely incapable and constantly fall into this trap - attacks that are intended to weaken the defense lines in front of and along the Surovikin Line, the Ukrainians must also use other tactical-level operations to achieve their aforementioned objective. Why?
Because, as I mentioned before, they are numerically outnumbered in all weapons (land, naval, air - sometimes clearly outnumbered by the number of Russian equipment), and they must not only rely on what exists in military theory and military practice but also innovate.
Thus, fixing tens of thousands of Russians, convinced by the Ukrainians - who planned to turn Bakhmut into a symbol, but also into what I call the "Wagner Cemetery" - that Bakhmut is essential (which it is not), makes their work easier on the southern front and significantly increases their chances of success.
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By the way, for those skeptical of my optimism: almost no one here knows me, but on Facebook, I have written analyses that have proven to be true, and Night Summaries (95 in the first 100 nights of the war, to give you an idea of my involvement and attention to it - this was BEFORE spending 3 months on the eastern front in the contact line - and I'm still doing this when not in Ukraine with a bit more important things to do), and I was met with skepticism and even accused of being too optimistic.
I want to remind you of a few fundamental things that we seem to forget:
1. Russia's strategic objective was to capture the Ukrainian government or at least force it to leave Kyiv, and control Ukraine through a puppet government and president. This initial objective failed.
2. The subsequent strategic objective was the division of Ukraine and the control of all illegally annexed parts through a decree by Vladimir Putin. This subsequent objective also failed.
3. The subsequent strategic objective was to maintain the conquered territories (including a large part of the Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson Oblast west of the Dnieper River). This subsequent objective also failed.
4. The next strategic objective of Russia was the conquest of Donbas. This one also failed miserably.
The only successful operational-level objective for the Russians was this land bridge between Donbas and Crimea. This will also be lost by the end of the year.
Therefore, the decision of the Ukrainian Central Military Command, the Battle for Bakhmut led by the exceptional General Sirskyi, against all warnings from the Collective West, was one that I (you have no way of knowing, as I wrote these analyses on Facebook in Romanian) applauded with sadness, knowing the losses Ukraine would suffer, but at the same time understanding its long-term motivation. I was part of a minority. Even many Ukrainians, listening to respectable and honorable Western military analysts (no irony here), were disoriented and frightened. HOWEVER!
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That decision has proven to have repercussions not only in Ukraine, the incredible weakening of the Russian Army, the decline in morale, disorientation, and inability to coordinate, but it also has repercussions inside Russia, within its own state (Progojin's incursion, the disappearance of Surovikin, the deaths by falling from windows of important people in the state, the disappearance of others, etc).
Conclusion:
The Battle for Bakhmut, which I consider the Second Battle for Bakhmut, regardless of what Wikipedia says, or what others say, is essential for Ukraine's operational objective to reach the Sea of Azov, if not even an attempt to penetrate Crimea. But as I said before, and I will say it again: don't forget to keep an eye on the eastern front.
The night is long and full of terror for the Russians. On the land of sunrise, the sun sets.
Russia has already lost. Now Ukraine just needs to win! For that, we need each and every one of you! Because we are in a space of informational warfare. If you believe that this micro-analysis deserves to be known, especially by those who are still unconvinced of the usefulness of the Battle for Bakhmut or why the Ukrainians are still attacking there, then please disseminate the information through likes, retweets, or simply by engaging with the post through comments.
Ukraine will prevail as long as we all stand up against the skeptics and trolls on our "battlefield," and for that, we need accurate information, especially information that brings value to those who read these texts, which, yes, I know, are lengthy.
Glory to Ukraine!